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Abstract The advent of large-scale distributed systems poses unique engineering chal-
lenges. In open systems such as the internet it is not possible to prescribe the behaviour
of all of the components of the system in advance. Rather, we attempt to design infrastruc-
ture, such as network protocols, in such a way that the overall system is robust despite the
fact that numerous arbitrary, non-certiﬁed, third-party components can connect to our sys-
tem. Economists have long understood this issue, since it is analogous to the design of the
rules governing auctions and other marketplaces, in which we attempt to achieve socially-
desirableoutcomesdespitetheimpossibilityofprescribingtheexactbehaviourofthemarket
participants, who may attempt to subvert the market for their own personal gain. This ﬁeld
is known as ”mechanism design”: the science of designing rules of a game to achieve a spe-
ciﬁc outcome, even though each participant may be self-interested. Although it originated in
economics, mechanism design has become an important foundation of multi-agent systems
(MAS) research. In a traditional mechanism design problem, analytical methods are used to
prove that agents’ game-theoretically optimal strategies lead to socially desirable outcomes.
In many scenarios, traditional mechanism design and auction theory yield clear-cut results;
however, there are many situations in which the underlying assumptions of the theory are vi-
olated due to the messiness of the real-world. In this paper we review alternative approaches
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to mechanism design which treat it as an engineering problem and bring to bear engineering
design principles, viz.: iterative step-wise reﬁnement of solutions, and satisﬁcing instead of
optimization in the face of intractable complexity. We categorize these approaches under the
banner of evolutionary mechanism design.
1 Introduction
Much work in the design of multi-agent systems (MAS) has focused on the design and en-
gineering of individual agents; for example, the problems of designing and implementing
effective trading strategies for agents participating in e-commerce market places, or the de-
sign of effective learning algorithms for adaptive agents. However, increasingly attention is
being turned to the design of the infrastructure, or the environment, underlying the inter-
actions between individual agents in a MAS; for example, the problem of designing rules
governing the operation of an e-commerce market institution, or the design of interaction
protocols governing agent argumentation. The justiﬁcation for the latter approach is that of-
ten as MAS designers we are responsible for engineering open systems, in which we do not
have control over the exact behavior of the agents connecting to our system; these agents
are, after all, autonomous. Rather, we build a set of standards and protocols that deﬁne a
framework within which our agents are free to interact, and if we have designed this frame-
work to be robust, the system as a whole will exhibit our desired design properties despite
the fact that it consists of possibly millions of autonomous agents interacting with each other
in ways we have not prescribed in advance.
Such systems are known as self-organising complex systems (SOCS) (Heylighen, 1999).
Examples of such systems are market places, ecosystems, nervous systems, neural networks,
co-evolving systems, and of course, multi-agent systems. They are complex, in the sense
that they consist of many parts with many interactions between them and exhibit non-linear,
hard-to-predict behaviour, and they are self-organising in the sense that macro-level stabil-
ities emerge despite the underlying complexity. As an example, consider a stock market
consisting of hundreds of thousands of traders. Each trader is an autonomous agent, free to
trade using whatever strategy they want. Individual prices at any given time are determined
by the trading behaviour of all of other agents trading in the market; thus the actions of
each agent can potentially inﬂuence all other agents; there are many interactions between
the components of the system. Many aspects of the market’s behaviour are chaotic or hard
to predict, for example the price of an individual stock, or the proﬁts of an individual trader.
Yet despite this complexity, the variables that the stock-market “designer” is interested in,
for example the overall market efﬁciency, remain at consistently satisﬁcing values. Addi-
tionally, such systems are robust to exogenous perturbation; for example, after the stock
market has been subjected to a shock, such as a market crash, the system eventually settles
back into a state in which the design variables, for example market efﬁciency, are held at
desirable values despite the fact that there is no explicit top-down control mechanism for
achieving this. Such self-healing or homeostatic behaviour is typical of SOCS in general.
These systems possess state-space dynamics with attractors and stable states (also known as
equilibria) that lead the system to homeostatic states — that is, states in which our design
variables are maximised or held within desirable ranges.
As designers of a multi-agent system, we are therefore tasked with ensuring that the
complex system embodied by our MAS possesses attractors or equilibria in which our design
objectives are met. But how can we affect the dynamics of our system if we are not allowed
to prescribe the behaviour of individual agents? What free variables are at our disposal? The3
answer, of course is outlined above; in MAS design problems we typically have some control
over the environment or infrastructure in which third-party agents interact. This can take the
form of, for example, rules governing an auction mechanism, or the protocols used by agents
for argumentation. Small changes in these rules or standards can have dramatic effects on the
behaviour of the agents using these rules, and can radically alter the underlying dynamics of
the system in surprising ways. By altering the underlying dynamics, we are sometimes able
to adjust the system so that the stable states of the system exhibit the homeostatic properties
we desire. For example, in a market-design context, by tweaking the rules of the market, we
are sometimes able to design systems in which optimal allocative-efﬁciency is an emergent
stable macro-property of the system.
Economistshavestudiedsimilardesignproblemsinthecontextofauctiontheory(Klem-
perer, 2004a; Krishna, 2002) and mechanism design (Jackson, 2003; Varian, 1995). In a
mechanism design problem, the task of the designer is to choose the rules of the auction in
such a way that the designer’s objectives are met when agents play their optimal strategies.
One of the main difﬁculties in solving this problem is computing the optimal strategies, as
the best strategy to play depends on what strategies are being played by other agents; the
number of agents can vary signiﬁcantly, and the strategy space can be very large. The stan-
dard technique is to view each possible set of auction rules as deﬁning a particular game,
and then to use game theory to “solve” this game by ﬁnding the set of strategies comprising
a Nash equilibrium of the game — the set of strategies that are best responses to each other.
For many scenarios, especially for single-sided auctions comprising a single seller and mul-
tiple buyers, auction theory and mechanism design yield clear-cut results. However, in the
general case the problem is analytically intractable, especially when it comes to analysing
double-sided auctions, also known as exchanges, in which we allow multiple sellers as well
as multiple-buyers. In the next section we shall describe our motivation for studying double-
sided auctions.
A double-auction mechanism is a generalization of an auction in which there are multi-
ple sellers as well as multiple buyers, and both buyers and sellers are allowed to exchange
offers simultaneously. Since double-auctions allow dynamic pricing on both the supply side
andthedemandsideofthemarketplace,theirstudyisofgreatimportance,bothtotheoretical
economists (Klemperer, 2004b), and those seeking to implement real-world market places.
On the one hand, economists who are interested in theories of price formation in idealized
models of general markets have often turned to exchange-like models such as Walrasian
tˆ atonnement, to describe and understand the price-formation process (Bryant, 2000), and on
the other hand, variants of the double-auction are used in large real-world exchanges to trade
commodities in marketplaces where supply and demand ﬂuctuate rapidly, such as markets
for stocks, futures, and their derivatives.
However, the models of exchanges traditionally used by economists in general equilib-
rium theory are often simpliﬁed for the purposes of analytical tractability to such an extent
thattheyareofscantrelevancetothedesignersofreal-worldexchanges,andeven,itissome-
times argued, of scant relevance to the theoretical modelling of markets (Fisher, 1983). For
example, one important simpliﬁcation often made is that the number of agents participating
in a market is very large; this simpliﬁcation allows relative market power and consequent
strategic effects to be ignored. However, in many real-world marketplaces, such as deregu-
lated wholesale electricity markets, there may be relatively few competitors on one or both
sides of the market. With small numbers of participants, general equilibrium models break
down (Medio and Gallo, 1992, p. 10) because they fail to allow for market power, and the
potential gains of strategic behavior, of participants.4
1.1 Auction Theory & Mechanism Design
Auction theory can be thought of as an alternative approach to general equilibrium theory,
in which we build a more sophisticated micro-model of the marketplace, and we use game-
theoretictechniquestoanalysetherationalbehaviorof individualagentsfacedwithdifferent
pricing institutions. Whereas neoclassical equilibrium theory often abstracts away from the
details of individual agents, game-theoretic models allow economists to build sophisticated
micro-models of individual agents’ reasoning and preferences. In many scenarios, especially
in analyzing single-sided monopoly markets, these models have been spectacularly success-
ful to the extent where they have been directly applied to the design of real-world auctions
for high-value government and corporate assets (Klemperer, 2002). However, in other prac-
tical scenarios, especially when it comes to analyzing and designing double-sided markets,
such as exchanges, there are still a number of problems with the theory, which we shall
brieﬂy review.
Auction-theorists typically analyze a proposed market institution by deﬁning a set of
design objectives, and then proceed to show that these design objectives are brought about
when rational agents follow their best strategies according to a game-theoretic analysis.
The task of choosing the rules of the market institution so that these objectives are brought
about is called mechanism design. The typical design objectives considered by mechanism
designers are:
Allocative efﬁciency: The outcome of using the mechanism should be optimal in some de-
ﬁned sense, for example, the total surplus generated should equal the available surplus
in competitive equilibrium.
Budget balance: No outside subsidy inwards or transfers outwards are required for a deal to
be reached.
Individual rationality: The expected net beneﬁt to each participant from using the mecha-
nism should be no less than the net beneﬁt of any alternative.
Incentive compatibility: Participants should not be able to gain an advantage from non-
truth-telling behavior.
We would like auction mechanisms to satisfy all of these properties. However, this is not
possible in many situations. For example, the impossibility result of (Myerson and Satterth-
waite, 1983) demonstrates that no double-sided auction mechanism can be simultaneously
efﬁcient, budget-balanced and individually-rational. Moreover, many of the underpinnings
of the theory assume that designers’ interests are restricted to only the aforementioned prop-
erties. For example, the revelation principle (Krishna, 2002, p. 62) states that, without loss
of generality, we may safely restrict attention to mechanisms in which agents reveal their
types truthfully. However, this result does not take into account the potential cost or other
practicalities of polling agents for their type information. Once minimizing the cost of rev-
elation is introduced as a design objective, the revelation principle ceases to hold, because
there may exist partial-revelation mechanisms with non-truthful equilibria which sacriﬁce
incentive-compatibility for expedience of revelation. This is of more than academic interest,
since in real-world electronic exchanges it is rarely possible to poll all agents for their valua-
tions before clearing the market; hence the continuous double-auction, in which we execute
the clearing operation as new offers arrive, thus increasing liquidity (transaction throughput)
at the expense of incentive-compatibility.
In designing market places, as with any other engineering problem, we often need to
make such trade-offs between different objectives depending on the exact requirements and
scenario at hand. We can often satisfactorily solve such multi-objective optimisation prob-5
lems, provided that we have some kind of quantitative assessment of each objective, yet
classical auction-theory provides only a binary yes or no indication of whether each of its
limiteddesignobjectivesisachievable,makingitextremelydifﬁculttocomparethedifferent
trade-offs.
Further complications arise when we attempt to use auction-theory to analyze existing
(“legacy”) market institutions. Exchanges such as the London Stock Exchange1 have been
in existence far longer than game-theory and auction-theory, thus, unsurprisingly, the orig-
inal rules of the institution were not necessarily based on sound game-theoretic or auction-
theoretic principles. Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect that core ﬁnancial institutions such
as these radically alter their rules overnight in response to the latest fashionable develop-
ments in auction-theory or game-theory. Rather, it may be more salient to view ﬁnancial
institutions evolving gradually and incrementally in response to a changing environment.
Similarly, agents participating in these institutions do not necessarily instantaneously and
simultaneously adjust their trading behavior to the theoretical optimum strategy; for exam-
ple, adoption of a new trading strategy may spread through a population of traders as word
of its efﬁcacy diffuses in a manner akin to mimetic evolution.2 Thus, we may think of the
institutions we see today as the outcome of a co-evolutionary adaptation between ﬁnancial
institutions on the one hand, and trading strategies on the other.
The issue of legacy institutions has ramiﬁcations for mechanism design; in these con-
texts the choice of adjustments to the auction rules may be tightly constrained by existing
infrastructure, both physical and social; thus it may be necessary to examine the attainabil-
ity of equilibria under the new design given existing strategic behavior in the legacy design.
Classical auction theory relies on classical game-theory which in turn says nothing about
the dynamics of adjustment to equilibrium.
For such applications, we need to turn to models of evolution and learning in strategic
environments; models that we collectively categorize under the banner of evolutionary game
theory. Models of learning and evolution as applied to agents’ strategies are not new. Where
our approach differs, however, is in the application of models of learning and evolution to
the market mechanism itself, a new ﬁeld we call evolutionary mechanism design.
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature
on the application of AI to the modelling of agent interactions in strategic environments such
as stock markets and distributed computing systems. In Section 3 we review the emerging
literature on the application of AI to the design of the infrastructure underlying these in-
teractions, i.e. the mechanism design problem, with an emphasis on own work in this area.
Finally we conclude in Section 4 and discuss future research directions.
2 Agent-based Economics
It has long been understood that Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI) has strong roots in economics
(Russell and Norvig, 2003, p. 9); whilst the latter is traditionally concerned with idealized
models of agents interacting in realistically complex environments, the former has placed
more emphasis on realistically complex agents interacting in idealized environments. In-
deed, one of the pioneers of AI, Herbert Simon was originally motivated in much of his
AI research by attempts to build more complex models of agents’ behaviour in economic
environments (see, for example (Clarkson and Simon, 1960)).
1 www.londonstockexchange.com
2 The adoption by derivatives traders of the Black-Scholes equation for option pricing provides an example
(MacKenzie, 2003).6
Whilst the broad relationships between the two disciplines were generally understood
from the inception of AI, it was not until the late twentieth century and the birth of the
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) discipline that highly specialised theories and concepts were
imported from economics into AI. Boutilier et al. (Boutilier et al, 1997) were amongst the
ﬁrst to clearly articulate the speciﬁc relationships between economics and AI. The particular
signiﬁcance of mechanism design in the context of multi-agent systems was ﬁrst discussed
in (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994) and (Varian, 1995), as summarised by Wellman:
“Withineconomics,theproblemofsynthesizinganinteractionprotocolviawhich
rational agents achieve a socially desirable end is called mechanism design. This is
exactly the problem we face in designing distributed software systems, which sug-
gests an opportunity to exploit existing economic ideas. ” (Wellman, 1995)
More recently the theme of incentive engineering has been taken up in the wider com-
puter science community in contexts as diverse as information security (Anderson, 2001),
and computer networking:
“If an artifact (a new congestion control protocol, a new caching scheme, a new
routing algorithm, etc.) is demonstrated to have superior performance, this does not
necessarily mean that it will be successful. For the artifact to be ‘ﬁt’, there must exist
a path leading from the present situation to its prevalence. This path must be paved
with incentives that will motivate all kinds of diverse agents to adopt it, implement
it, use it, interface with it or just tolerate it. In the absence of such a path, the most
clever, fast and reliable piece of software may stay just that. All design problems are
now mechanism design problems.” (Papadimitriou, 2001)
2.1 The Double Auction
Our work focuses speciﬁcally on a particular class of economic mechanism — the double
auction. As discussed in the previous section, the double auction has come to be recognized
as an important benchmark problem, in both economics and multi-agent systems. In par-
ticular, a landmark workshop held in Santa Fe (Friedman and Rust, 1991) motivated much
contemporary research in this area by highlighting the difﬁculty of agents’ decision prob-
lems in non-idealized variants of this type of marketplace, and the Santa Fe double-auction
tournament was one of the ﬁrst studies which used advanced agent-based simulation in or-
der to explore the properties of this mechanism (Friedman and Rust, 1993). To this day the
double-auction still represents an important benchmark problem by simultaneously admit-
ting of precise representations whilst stretching the bounds of both analytical tractability
and computational brute-force. In the following we will review analytical and computa-
tional approaches to the agents’ decision problem (traditionally the focus of AI), and the
mechanism-design problem (traditionally the focus of economics) in turn.
2.1.1 Analytical approaches
The core of the analytic approach to agents’ decision problems is based around the theory
of n-player non-zero-sum games as formulated by John Nash (Nash, 1950). Nash’s insight
was that in any interaction of preference-maximising agents whose outcome depends on the
joint set of actions — that is, a game — any given agent has a theoretical best response to
the actions chosen by the other agents. By applying this reasoning recursively we arrive at7
the concept of a Nash equilibrium; a situation in which every agent chooses actions that are
best-responses to the best-responses of other agents. Nash proved that every n-player game
possesses at least one equilibrium solution, thus providing a powerful theoretical framework
not only for optimizing one’s strategy in such an interaction (choosing a best-response), but
also in predicting a likely combination of joint actions (Nash equilibrium). Many reﬁne-
ments have since been made to Nash’s theory, some of the most important being Harsanyi’s
concept of a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (BNE) (Harsanyi, 1967), which deals with situa-
tions where payoffs are dependent on some private unobservable properties of an agent —
the agent’s type (for example, the particular cards that an agent holds in a game of poker),
and Maynard Smith’s theory of evolutionary games (Maynard-Smith, 1982; Gintis, 2000)
which overlays a dynamic model of gradual strategy-adjustment on top of the static equilib-
ria of Nash’s original formulation.
Game-theory provides a very powerful general framework for solving agent interactions
in theory, but it was William Vickrey (Vickrey, 1961, 1962) who ﬁrst saw the fundamental
economic signiﬁcance of auctions and who ﬁrst applied the theory of games in this area
giving birth to modern auction theory, as summarised by Vijay Krishna in his comprehensive
overview of the state of the art (Krishna, 2002).
Auction theory provides a comprehensive theoretical framework for analysing single
sided auctions — that is, auctions with a single seller and multiple buyers. However, double-
sided auctions — auctions with multiple sellers as well as multiple buyers — remain some-
thing of a theoretical oddity despite their increasing prevalence in economic reality. Vick-
rey (Vickrey, 1961) demonstrated that no double-sided mechanism could simultaneously
achieve the incentive compatibility, individual-rationality, budget-balance and efﬁciency
desiderata. Subsequently d’Aspremont and G´ erard-Varet (d’Aspremont and G´ erard-Varet,
1979) demonstrated the existence of a budget-balanced mechanism that was able to achieve
incentive-compatibility in Bayesian-Nash equilibrium3 at the expense of individual rational-
ity. McAfee (McAfee, 1992) provided a formulation of a double-sided single-unit mecha-
nism that admitted of a dominant-strategy game-theoretic solution at the expense of budget-
balance, and Huang et al. later reﬁned this idea to the multi-unit case (Huang et al, 2002).
However Myerson and Satterthwaite (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983; Satterthwaite and
Williams, 1993) were able to extend Vickrey’s result and demonstrated that for the case of
a single buyer and seller there does not exist a mechanism that can simultaneously achieve
incentive-compatibility, budget-balance, efﬁciency and individual-rationality even when the
incentive-compatibility criteria is relaxed from dominant-strategy to BNE, and hence there
is no double-sided mechanism for achieving all the usual desiderata required by auction
theorists in the general case.
Although there is no unequivocal and complete game-theoretic analysis of the double-
auction in the general case, that is not to say, however, that double-sided mechanisms do not
admit of game-theoretic solutions in speciﬁc instances. The ﬁrst equilibrium analysis for a
double auction was that of Chatterjee and Samuelson (Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1983), in
the paper in which they introduced the idea of the k-double auction4, which we will discuss
in the next chapter, albeit only for the two trader case. In this initial paper, Chatterjee and
Samuelson show that there is an equilibrium solution, assuming independent private values.
Considerable work has since been carried out extending this result. First, Williams
showed the existence of equilibria in the buyer’s bid double auction (Williams, 1991, 1988)
3 Bayesian-Nash incentive-compatibility merely requires truth-telling as Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of
the game, rather than the usual stricter requirement that truth-telling is a dominant-strategy.
4 Though not under this name — they refer to the price setting rule as a “bargaining rule”.8
— this is an easier auction to analyse since the dominant strategy for sellers is to bid their
true value, thus ﬁxing one side of the auction and, as (Rustichini et al, 1994) points out, en-
suring that the market has a unique equilibrium5. The same authors subsequently showed the
existence of equilibria in the many-trader version of the k-double auction (Satterthwaite and
Williams, 1993), at the same time suggesting that the modiﬁed BBDA has no equilibrium.
This work was followed by Jackson and Swinkels (Jackson and Swinkels, 2001, 2005), who
showed the existence of equilibria, though not monotonic equilibria, under a wide range of
conditions. Next, Reny and Perry (Reny and Perry, 2003) showed that monotonic equilib-
ria exist if offers are restricted to discrete values, and Fudenberg et al. (Fudenberg et al,
2003) showed that this result could be extended to continuous values (which (Jackson and
Swinkels, 2005) argues is “a very useful approximation ...allowing one ...to use calculus to
characterise equilibria”) provided that the auction was large. Finally, Kadan (Kadan, 2004)
showed that an increasing equilibrium exists for just two traders with afﬁliated values.
2.1.2 Empirical approaches
Whilst double-auction mechanisms stretch the bounds auction-theory by admitting of no
unequivocal dominant strategy solution in the general case, the theory of games itself has
come under scrutiny as a plausible general-purpose model of the strategic behavior of com-
plex agents (human or otherwise); for example, Goeree and Holt (Goeree and Holt, 2001)
give an overview of ten simple games where the game-theoretic solution is easily obtain-
able yet intuitively implausible. This has led to a re-examination of the use of empirical
methods in economics, whereby experiments are conducted with actual agents trading in
a market-institution under laboratory conditions. The agents may be human, in which case
the methodology is sometimes called experimental economics (see for example (Kagel and
Roth, 1995)), or more generally they may be implemented in the form of a computer-
program; Tesfatsion coined the phrase agent-based computational economics (ACE), to de-
scribe this approach (Tesfatsion, 2002).
Experimental economics using human agents has the advantage that a large supply of
agents are available “off the shelf” so to speak; hence not surprisingly experiments using
human agents were among the ﬁrst ACE investigations of the double-auction market. Smith
(Smith, 1962) was the ﬁrst to study the double-auction under laboratory conditions using
human-agents, and his results suggested that human subjects were able to extract close to
theoretically optimal surplus from the market.
Oneofthedisadvantagesofhuman-basedexperimentaleconomicscomparedwithagent-
based computational economics is that it is not always straightforward to analyze the neces-
sary cognitive mechanisms required to achieve a particular economic outcome. In contrast,
Gode and Sunder (Gode and Sunder, 1993) performed one of the earliest agent-based experi-
mentsonthedouble-auctionwiththeaimofinvestigatingthelower-boundsontheamountof
cognitive machinery required to achieve efﬁcient outcomes. They were able to demonstrate
that their minimal zero-intelligence strategies, implemented in the form of computer pro-
grams, were able to achieve highly efﬁcient outcomes, suggesting that the double-auction
mechanism was highly robust in the sense that it required minimal rationality on behalf
of participants. Their results were not unequivocal, however; Cliff and Bruten (Cliff and
Bruten, 1997) demonstrated that some aspects of Gode and Sunder’s results were highly
5 Note that all results for the BBDA, the 1-DA, are symmetric with those for the k-double auction in which
the transaction price is determined by the price offered by the highest asking seller that trades, the 0-DA
(Rustichini et al, 1994).9
contingent on the particular distribution of agents’ valuations that were used in the orig-
inal experiments, and that a more sophisticated and robust strategy, zero-intelligence plus
(ZIP) was required in order more accurately ﬁt the behaviour of human subjects under less
restrictive assumptions.
This was not the end of the story, though, since when analysing a market mechanism
ideally we want to demonstrate the existence of a dominant strategy, and that design objec-
tives such as high-efﬁciency outcomes are the result of agents adopting this particular strat-
egy. For example, in many single-sided auctions one of the desiderata usually considered is
incentive-compatibility; the dominant bidding strategy should be to bid truthfully at one’s
valuation. Unless we can demonstrate that an economic outcome such as high efﬁciency is
the result of agents adopting a dominant strategy, or at the very least an equilibrium strat-
egy proﬁle, we can never be sure that the strategy under which high efﬁciency is observed
will not, at some point, be discarded in favour of an alternative strategy which yields higher
payoff for its adopters at the expense of overall social welfare. By analogy, consider the pris-
oner’s dilemma game (Flood, 1952; Bendor and Swistak, 1997; Axelrod, 1997); although
the cooperative strategy yields the highest welfare outcome if all agents adopt it, this does
not sufﬁce to demonstrate that both agents will adopt the cooperative strategy since there
will always be a temptation to choose the defection strategy.
Thus there have been numerous attempts to craft agent-based trading strategies for
double-auctions that are able to out-compete other strategies: Preist and van Tol (Preist and
van Tol, 2003) devised a variant of Cliff’s ZIP strategy that was able to trade in persistent-
shout auctions; Gjerstad and Dickhaut (GD) introduced a trading strategy that estimates the
probability of a bid being accepted as a function of bid price based on an analysis of histor-
ical market data, and then bids to maximise expected proﬁt (Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 2001);
Todd Kaplan’s (Friedman and Rust, 1991) entry into the Santa Fe tournament was one of the
ﬁrst documented double-auction sniping strategies, which wait until the last minute before
submitting a bid in order to prevent counter-bidding; Tesauro and Das (Tesauro and Das,
2001) introduced variants of the GD and ZIP strategies that were able to trade in continuous-
time environments; Nicolaisen et al. (Nicolaisen et al, 2001) used a trading strategy based
on Roth and Erev’s (Erev and Roth, 1998) reinforcement-learning (Kaelbling et al, 1996)
model of human game playing to analyse a simulated electricity market; and Hsu and Soo
(Hsu and Soo, 2001) analysed the performance of a strategy based on the q-learning algo-
rithm (Watkins and Dayan, 1992). Variations on these and other strategies have been pitted
against each other in several public tournaments designed to elicit new strategy designs from
the ACE community (Greenwald and Stone, 2001; Wellman et al, 2001; Friedman and Rust,
1993). Although some of these strategies have advantages over others in certain situations,
and there are pros and cons to each, there is evidence to suggest that none of them are dom-
inant over the others (Walsh et al, 2002), even putting aside the problem of demonstrating
that any are dominant over the entire space of possible strategies.
2.1.3 Evolutionary search
Much of the work cited in the previous section focussed on showing that particular strate-
gies yield high payoff if deployed in a market in which all agents adopt the same strategy
homogeneously. However, if we have reason to believe that none of the strategies from the
previous section are dominant over the others when they interact with each other in the same
marketplace, we have no reason to believe that any single one of them will come to be used
in a real market. Hence if we simply compute market outcomes by running experiments in10
which we equip agents homogeneously with the same non-dominant strategy, we are not
necessarily nearer to understanding the economic properties of the double-auction.
Of course, it may be the case that a single dominant strategy simply does not exist for
the double-auction game; instead, some mixture of these, or yet to be discovered strategies,
might constitute a Nash equilibrium. That is, even though no single strategy is “optimal”
in the sense that it is dominant over the others, some mix of these or other strategies might
constitute best-responses to each other. If this were the case and our market were populated
by such a mix of strategies, we might expect that such a state of affairs would persist in
reality, since by deﬁnition if the agents were to change their strategy they would be worse
off. Therefore the agents themselves would have an incentive to maintain the status quo; and
thus the components of the system would tend to naturally drive the system back towards
such an equilibrium. Thus if we evaluate the properties of the mechanism when it is in
these equilibrium states, we might expect that our predictions for variables such as market-
efﬁciency will be accurate for some reasonable duration, and if our design objectives are
maximised in these equilibria we will have shown that our mechanism is homeostatic.
In order to assess whether or not there are mixtures of strategies constituting equilibria,
it is necessary to systematically evaluate the strategic interaction between the known strate-
gies, as well as the space of yet to be considered strategies. Since this search-space is very
large, exhaustive search is unfeasible. This has led researchers to turn to heuristic meth-
ods such as evolutionary search as a possible methods for studying the interaction between
different double-auction strategies by systematically sampling the search space, e.g.: Cliff
(Cliff, 1998) used evolutionary search to explore the parameter space of his ZIP strategy, and
Andrews and Prager (Andrews and Prager, 1994) used Koza’s genetic programming tech-
nique (Koza, 1993) to search for a best-response to a uniform mixed-strategy of the Santa Fe
tournament entries. Co-evolutionary algorithms (Hillis, 1992; Angeline and Pollack, 1993;
Pollack and Blair, 1998) are highly promising in this respect. In a co-evolutionary search
the ﬁtness of individuals in the population is evaluated relative to one another in joint
interactions (similarly to payoffs in a strategic game), and it is suggested that in certain
circumstances the converged population is an approximate Nash solution to the underly-
ing game; that is, the stable states, or equilibria, of the co-evolutionary process are related
to the game-theoretic equilibria. Price (Price, 1997) and Dawid (Dawid, 1999) used co-
evolutionary search to explore convergence to equilibrium states in the double-auction.
However, there are many caveats to interpreting the equilibrium states of standard co-
evolutionary algorithms as approximations of game-theoretic equilibria, as discussed in de-
tail by Sevan Ficici (Ficici and Pollack, 2000, 1998). This has led to a number of reﬁne-
ments to standard co-evolutionary algorithms by incorporating game-theoretic concepts di-
rectly into the co-evolutionary algorithm itself (Noble and Watson, 2001; Ficici and Pollack,
2003; Ficici, 2004); the use of heuristic search (evolutionary or otherwise) to ﬁnd approxi-
mate best-response or equilibrium strategies is a topic that we shall return to in Section 3.3.
2.2 A hybrid approach: empirical game-theory
The various caveats discussed above with the game-theoretic, agent-based and evolutionary
approaches, as used in isolation, have inspired hybrid approaches whereby agent-based ex-
perimentation is used to build an approximate game-theoretic representation which is then
solvedusingstandardtechniquesfromclassicalandevolutionarygame-theory.Thismethod-
ology is known as empirical game-theory, and it is the principle methodology used in our
work (Section 3.2.1). Many studies prior to 2000 had started to take a more principled and11
systematic approach to studying the interaction between complex strategies in a simulation
context, for example Rust, Miller and Palmer systematically studied convergence to equi-
librium of the strategies in the original Santa Fe tournament using ideas very similar to evo-
lutionary game-theory (Friedman and Rust, 1991, p. 183–189). These ideas matured within
the MAS community, and a research group at Michigan set this kind of analysis in a rigorous
game-theoretic terms: in 2002 Walsh et al. demonstrated the effectiveness of the technique
for several bargaining games, including a double-auction (Walsh et al, 2002); Walsh, Parkes
and Das introduced a reﬁnement to the technique to concentrate the sampling of simula-
tions on those experiments that were most critical to the equilibrium analysis (Walsh et al,
2003); Reeves et al. performed a game-theoretic analysis of strategies in a market-based
scheduling scenario (Reeves et al, 2005) and Wellman and his students (Jordan et al, 2007;
Wellman et al, 2005) used empirical game-theoretic analysis in relation to the trading agent
competition and other games (Jordan et al, 2008).
The basic idea of empirical game theory is to obviate many of the tractability prob-
lems discussed in previous sections by restricting attention to small representative sample
of “heuristic” strategies that are known to be commonly played in a given multi-state game.
For many games, unsurprisingly none of the strategies commonly in use is dominant over
the others. Given the lack of a dominant strategy, it is then natural to ask if there are mixtures
of these “pure” strategies that constitute game-theoretic equilibria.
For small numbers of players and heuristic strategies, we can construct a relatively small
normal-form payoff matrix which is amenable to game-theoretic analysis. This heuristic
payoff matrix is calibrated by running many iterations of the game; variations in payoffs
due to different player-types (eg private valuations) or stochastic environmental factors (e.g.
PRNG seed) are averaged over many samples of type information resulting in a single mean
payoff to each player for each entry in the payoff matrix. Players’ types are assumed to
be drawn independently from the same distribution, and an agent’s choice of strategy is
assumed to be independent of its type, which allows the payoff matrix to be further com-
pressed, since we simply need to specify the number of agents playing each strategy to
determine the expected payoff to each agent. Thus for a game with j strategies, we represent
entries in the heuristic payoff matrix as vectors of the form
p =
¡
p1;:::;pj
¢
where pi speciﬁes the number of agents who are playing the ith strategy. Each entry p 2 P
is mapped onto an outcome vector q 2 Q of the form
q =
¡
q1;:::qj
¢
where qi speciﬁes the expected payoff to the ith strategy. For a game with n agents, the
number of entries in the payoff matrix is given by
s =
(n + j ¡ 1)!
n!(j ¡ 1)!
(1)
For small n and small j this results in payoff matrices of manageable size; for j = 3 and
n = 6, 8, and 10 we have s = 28, 45, and 66 respectively.
Oncethepayoffmatrixhasbeencomputedwecansubjectittoarigorousgame-theoretic
analysis, search for Nash equilibria solutions, and apply different models of learning and
evolution,suchasthereplicatordynamicsmodel(Maynard-Smith,1982),inordertoanalyse
the dynamics of adjustment to equilibrium.12
The equilibria solutions that are thus obtained are not rigorous Nash equilibria for the
full multi-state game; there is always the possibility that an unconsidered strategy could
invade the equilibrium. Nevertheless, heuristic-strategy equilibria are sometimes more plau-
sible as models of real-world game playing than those obtained using, for example, a co-
evolutionary search, precisely because they restrict attention to strategies that are commonly
known and are in common use. We can therefore be conﬁdent that no commonly known
strategy for the game at hand will break our equilibrium, and thus the equilibrium stands at
least some chance of persisting in the short term future. In Section 3.2.1 we shall review the
application of empirical game theory to the mechanism design problem.
3 Evolutionary mechanism design
Whilst the application of computational techniques to the agent decision problem has a
comparatively long tradition, their application to the mechanism-design problem is more
recent. The economist Alvin Roth was the ﬁrst to pose mechanism-design as an engineering
problem (Roth, 2002), thus paving the way for the application of engineering techniques to
mechanism-design. The authors (Phelps et al, 2002b,a) and (Cliff, 2001, 2003) were the ﬁrst
to apply evolutionarysearch to the double-auction design problem with a viewto automating
the mechanism-design process. Subsequently (Byde, 2003) used evolutionary computing to
analyze a space of variants to the Vickrey nth-pricing rule in the context of single-sided
auctions.
Meanwhile,moregenerallytheresearchareasofautomated mechanismdesign(Conitzer
and Sandholm, 2002) and computational mechanism design (Dash et al, 2003) were emerg-
ing. Conitzer and Sandholm (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002; Sandholm, 2003) were the ﬁrst
to pose the automated mechanism-design problem in rigorous theoretical terms and to ana-
lyze the algorithmic complexity of the problem. This has also led to ideas in adaptive mecha-
nism design in which the mechanism changes over time in response to a changing economic
environment: David et al. (David et al, 2005) used Bayesian learning to optimize the rules
of a single-sided auction mechanism in cases where agents are constrained to discrete bid
prices.
In this paper we focus on evolutionary and iterative approaches, such as (Conitzer and
Sandholm, 2007), to mechanism design. The central theme of our work is that just as choice
of strategy is not a static problem, since agents may be constrained in their adjustment of
strategy over time, neither is mechanism-design; mechanism designers may also be con-
strained in their choice of mechanism rules, for example there may be legacy infrastructure
that prevents an institution such as a large stock exchange from radically altering its auc-
tion rules overnight. Just as constraints on strategy adjustment lead to evolutionary game
theory, constraints on mechanism adjustment lead to evolutionary mechanism-design. We
might think of the market institutions that we observe today as the equilibrium outcome of
a co-evolutionary process not just between individual strategies, but a co-evolution between
strategy and mechanism. Peyton Young was among the ﬁrst to propose this idea with a view
to explaining the evolution of economic institutions and social norms (Young, 2001), and
in our earlier work we used a similar idea to design economic institutions (Phelps et al,
2002a). In the next section we review this earlier work. Although this earlier approach has
several shortcomings, the central ideas are instructive in understanding the rationale behind
an iterative approach to mechanism design.13
3.1 Co-evolution of auction mechanisms and trading strategies
In our earlier work (Phelps et al, 2002a) we approached mechanism design as an iterative
process by simulating an co-evolutionary arms-race between two populations: on the one
hand, a population of mechanisms whose ﬁtness is determined by social welfare, and on
the other hand a population of trading strategies whose ﬁtness is determined by the util-
ity of individual agents. The rationale behind this approach is that as strategy population
evolved it would be able to ﬁnd strategies that manipulate the mechanism in the favour of
individual agents at the expense of social welfare. However, as non-truthful strategies start
to enter the market, we might expect the mechanism population to counter-adapt by ﬁnd-
ing alterations to the mechanism rules that are able to restore social welfare. In these early
co-evolutionary experiments, it was hoped that over time incentive-compatible mechanism
rules would evolve that were robust against a wide variety of trading strategies, in much
the same way that prey populations adapt robust defenses against predator populations in
co-evolutionary arms races in nature (Dawkins and Krebs, 1979; Valen, 1973).
This approach is similar in philosophy to that of (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2007):
“We start with a na¨ ıvely designed mechanism that is not strategy-proof (for ex-
ample, the mechanism that would be optimal in the absence of strategic behavior),
and we attempt to make it more strategy-proof. Speciﬁcally, the approach system-
atically identiﬁes situations in which an agent has an incentive to manipulate, and
corrects the mechanism to take away this incentive. This is done iteratively, and
the mechanism may or may not become (completely) strategy-proof eventually.”
(Conitzer and Sandholm, 2007, p. 2)
and reﬂects the iterative nature of real-world mechanism design:
“Real-world mechanisms are often initially na¨ ıve, leading to undesirable strate-
gic behavior; once this is recognized, the mechanism is amended to disincent the
undesirable behavior. For example, some na¨ ıvely designed mechanisms give bidders
incentives to postpone submitting their bids until just before the event closes (i.e.,
sniping); often this is (partially) ﬁxed by adding an activity rule, which prevents
bidders that do not bid actively early from winning later.” (Conitzer and Sandholm,
2007, p. 2)
Indeed, the design of real-world market mechanisms usually proceeds incrementally, as ac-
counts of the design of the rules for the US Federal Communications Commission’s auctions
ofPersonalCommunicationsServicesoperatinglicencesmakeclear(Nik-Khah,2005;Plott,
1997).
In our earlier work we focussed on one speciﬁc aspect of the design of a double-auction
market: the transaction pricing rule. The transaction pricing rule sets the price of any given
transactioninthemarketasafunctionofthebid andask offerpricessubmittedbybuyersand
sellers respectively. There are many different rules for setting transaction prices depending
on the scenario at hand. For example, a discriminatory pricing rule sets transaction prices
P ½ 2R:
Pi = MBi ¢ k + MSi ¢ (1 ¡ k) (2)
where k 2 [0;1] is a constant chosen by the market designer, and the multi-sets MB and
MS denote the prices of the matched6 bids and asks in the market respectively. A uniform
pricing rule, on the other hand, sets the same transaction price p 2 R for all matched offers:
6 Offers are matched when the bid (buy) price meets or exceeds the ask (sell) price14
p = eqa ¢ k + eqb ¢ (1 ¡ k) (3)
where:
eqa = min(min(MS
0);min(MB))
eqb = max(max(MS);max(MB
0))
and MB0 and MS0 denote the unmatched bid and ask prices respectively. Note that in case
of a single-sided auction where we have a a single seller with a reservation price, the k = 1
and k = 0 rules correspond to a 1st-price and 2nd-price (Vickrey) auction respectively
(Wurman et al, 1998).
In a private-values auction scenario, offer prices can be thought of as signals7 from the
traders expressing their valuation for the resource being traded. The difﬁculty the auctioneer
faces in allocating the resource to those who value it most highly (i.e. achieving an optimal
allocation or maximum market efﬁciency) is that these signals cannot necessarily be relied
upon to be truthful; agents might misreport their valuations in order to make proﬁt at the
expense of others. The traditional approach to this problem is to design incentive-compatible
mechanisms which have the property that the best strategy for every agent is to report their
valuation truthfully.
In the case where only a single unit of commodity is traded per transaction, the pricing
rules above can be shown to be efﬁcient and incentive-compatible for sellers when k = 1,
and similarly for buyers for k = 0. However, there is no value of k in a uniform-price
mechanism for which the mechanism is simultaneously incentive-compatible and efﬁcient
for all traders when multiple units can be traded (Wurman et al, 1998; Williams, 1988); i.e.
there is no mechanism within this space which is strictly optimal in the theoretical sense.
This result suggested to us the possibility of using heuristic search to ﬁnd mechanisms that
satisﬁced different design objectives.
In (Phelps et al, 2002a) a co-evolutionary algorithm (Hillis, 1992) was used to sim-
ulate an evolutionary “arms-race” between populations of trading strategies and a separate
population of transaction pricing rules (the mechanism population). Individuals in each pop-
ulation were represented as lisp expressions and evolved using Koza genetic-programming
(Koza, 1993). The ﬁtness function for the strategy populations was a function of the indi-
vidual proﬁts of traders playing those strategies, and the ﬁtness function for the pricing rule
population was a function of the overall market efﬁciency achieved by an auctioneer using
that rule against the current strategy populations.
Despite some promising preliminary results, it was found that this approach suffered
from a number of drawbacks. The main drawback was that the co-evolving system rapidly
descended into suboptimal auction mechanisms if the mechanism population was not arti-
ﬁcially seeded with individuals with a minimum-level of initial ﬁtness. In cases where the
mechanism population started from extremely low ﬁtness individuals, such as pricing rules
7 The term “signal” in this context derives from the theory of signaling games (Spence, 1973). Although
strictly speaking an auction is not a signaling game, the two are very strongly related. As Dutta points out
(Dutta, 2001, p. 395), in a signaling game the agents move ﬁrst and then the institution responds, whereas in
a mechanism design scenario the institution offers a set of moves to agents who then respond. Thus although
auctions are not strictly signaling games, it can still be intuitive to think in terms of signals; by forcing
agents to back up their value claims with hard cash the mechanism designer can encourage honest signaling.
Interestingly, signaling games have also been studied in evolutionary biology in the context of the handicap
principle (Zahavi and Zavahi, 1997; Bullock, 1997). In the scenario under discussion, bids — that is, signals
of valuation backed up with hard cash — can be thought of as “handicaps” which lead to honest signaling.15
which set the transaction price at 0 regardless of the signals arriving from traders, the strat-
egy populations would try and ﬁt to these artiﬁcially low-ﬁtness mechanisms and evolve
to a state where their bids were meaningless. Meanwhile the mechanism population would
be unable to discover more rational rules which worked with the existing “broken” trad-
ing strategies. Therefore the trading strategies could not evolve to work with more rational
mechanisms and so on.
It is often instructive to analyse co-evolutionary processes in game-theoretic terms, since
in a co-evolutionary interaction the ﬁtness assigned to any given individual depends on the
joint actions of the other individuals with which it interacts in a very similar manner to an
evolutionary game8. When we co-evolve auction mechanisms and trading strategies we are
implicitly deﬁning a game9 between two players: the mechanism player on the one hand,
and the trader player on the other. Each player attempts to maximise their payoff (analogous
to maximising ﬁtness); in our present scenario the mechanism player attempts to maximise
market efﬁciency EA, whereas the trader player attempts to maximise utility ui. Note that
if the selection function of our co-evolutionary algorithm picks individuals from each popu-
lation based on a stochastic function of ﬁtness rather than phenotype, then we are implicitly
modelling a game of imperfect information Although not every game possesses a dominant-
strategy, we know that all games possess at least one Nash equilibrium in which the strategy
adopted by every player is a best-response to every other player’s strategy. Consider a hy-
pothetical equilibrium for our game at hand in which the mechanism population chooses
a clearing-rule which sets the transaction price at a ﬁxed constant value 8i price(ci) = d
which is independent of the trader shout price, and in response the trader player adopts a
strategy of always submitting shouts with zero prices: 8i8t ³(i;t) = 0. Depending on the
distribution of trader valuations, a rule which sets transaction prices close to the expected
equilibrium price d ¼ E(p¤) would achieve a reasonable expected payoff E(EA) ¼ 1 for
the mechanism player. From an external mechanism designer’s point of view this clearing
rule is clearly brittle and undesirable, especially if the variance in valuations and hence in
efﬁciency is large. However, this hypothetical situation would be very hard to leave once we
arrive at it, since if the mechanism player attempts to switch to conventional clearing rules
which set transaction prices as a function of shout prices, it will be faced with the issue that
all shout prices are 0. Similarly, the trader player cannot improve their payoff by unilaterally
switching to any other strategy since their payoff is no longer a function of their shout price.
This situation is a game-theoretic equilibrium of the mechanism versus trader game.
If equilibria such as these have large basins of attraction10 under the dynamics of our
co-evolutionary process, then we should not be surprised if our co-evolutionary algorithm
converges on them. Indeed, this is the cause of one of the major problems that was en-
countered in the work reported in (Phelps et al, 2002a) — the co-evolutionary algorithm
sometimes converged on what appeared to be game-theoretic equilibria11, but it is not clear
8 Note that this applies regardless of whether we intuitively think of our original problem as a game. Game
theory is simply a mathematical tool that allows us to study co-dependent optimization problems — that is,
what potential solution should we choose given that our choice will inﬂuence the solution of other optimizers
and vice versa. This is precisely the scenario instantiated by a co-evolutionary algorithm; hence game-theory
is an invaluable theoretical tool in understanding the properties of co-evolutionary systems.
9 For conciseness and simplicity, in this section only we shall assume that many trading agents are under
control of the single notional trader player, and that all the agents adopt the same strategy that is speciﬁed by
the trader player at any given time.
10 See page 20.
11 Interestingly the equilibrium state that we ended up with was close to the equilibrium computed in Zhan
and Friedman (2005) where traders are restricted to constant mark-ups.16
that the theoretical equilibrium solutions of the mechanism versus trader game are always
desirable from a mechanism design perspective, as illustrated by the above example.
However, the Nash equilibria of the mechanism versus trader game are useful solutions
to a different, but interesting, problem. If we are modelling a process in which multiple
competing market institutions asynchronously adjust their rules over repeated interactions
in response to observed trader strategies in the real world, and vice versa, (analogous to the
scenario analysed by (Roth and Ockenfels, 2002) in which they compare two competing on-
lineauctionformats:eBayandAmazon),thenwemightexpectequilibriumsolutionssuchas
the ﬁxed-price clearing rule to be the rational end result. It is not inconceivable, for example,
that the reason that we continue to see a prevalence of ﬁxed-price institutions such as bricks-
and-mortar shops for selling consumer goods in real market places, despite the possibility
of dynamically-priced institutions such as eBay12, is due to fact that ﬁxed-price institutions
are an equilibrium solution of the real-life co-evolution between market mechanism and
trader behavior. For example, consumers may be unable to switch from a ﬁxed-price to an
auction market for their required good since one may not exist yet, and correspondingly it
may be very difﬁcult for a startup to create an online auction market in the absence of ex-
isting traders on either side of the market. This is consistent with a view proposed by Philip
Mirowski (Mirowski, 2001, pp.536–545) of economic marketplaces as complex ecologies.
Some markets, such as garage sales, have relatively simple rules and procedures, while oth-
ers, such as ﬁnancial futures markets, are, by comparison, very complex. Yet all manage to
co-exist, with each type of market, apparently, ﬁnding its own niche in which to survive and
prosper. Indeed, the oldest markets have survived for hundreds of years without adopting
the sophisticated rules evident in some newer markets. The behaviours of the participants in
the different markets are, as one would expect, different. One challenge for computational
economics, says Mirowski, is to explain this diversity of mechanisms, how it has arisen and
how it is maintained.
As well as accounting for historical and present observations of actual market behavior,
this analysis could also be normative; we might recommend that retailers adopt a ﬁxed-price
mechanism based on the fact that it is a best-response to the likely status quo. In this case
we might interpret our solution as “the optimal” one in some sense.
3.2 Mechanism Design as iterative heuristic optimisation
In the previous section we saw that co-evolutionary algorithms are natural models of games
of imperfect information, or simultaneous move games. The previous experiments could be
thought of as an analysis of evolutionary mechanism design in the case that the mechanism
designer and the traders are simultaneously attempting to anticipate the choice of the other.
However, it is sometimes more natural to view real-world mechanism design as a se-
quential iterative process involving a single institution (Phelps, 2008; Conitzer and Sand-
holm, 2007). In this case, the considerations from the previous section do not apply, since
the mechanism designer is given the opportunity to move ﬁrst by announcing their mech-
anism rules publicly to the trader population, who then respond by placing shouts in the
mechanism. In this scenario we no longer have a repeated simultaneous-move game, instead
we have a 2-move extensive-form game. In the ﬁrst move the mechanism player announces
their mechanism rules with perfect information, and in the second move the trader player
responds by placing shouts. In contrast to the previous section, in this scenario the trader
12 http://www.ebay.com/17
player does not have to attempt to “anticipate” the move made by the mechanism player;
rather it can form its strategy conditionally based on the mechanism rules chosen by the
mechanism player. Thus, as a mechanism designer we should choose the optimal mecha-
nism rules in the sense that the chosen rules optimise our design objectives when the trader
player plays their best strategy under that particular chosen mechanism.
This scenario is not straight-forwardly modelled by a standard co-evolutionary algo-
rithm; rather it is more natural to view it as a non-co-evolutionary optimisation problem in
which we evaluate each potential mechanism by computing the values of our design objec-
tives when traders play their best strategy for our candidate mechanism. An outline of such
a process is summarised in the pseudocode below.
input : A set of initial heuristic strategies S, and a legacy mechanism ¹
repeat 1
x Ã frequency of each strategy observed in vivo; 2
S Ã S [ f strategies observed in vivo g ; 3
¤ Ã space of feasible variants of ¹; 4
¹ Ã argmax¹¤2¤ EvaluateDesignObjectives(¹¤;S;x); 5
implement rules deﬁned by ¹; 6
until forever ; 7
We start with an initial set of auction rules comprising a real-life (in-vivo) mechanism ¹,
in which we observe a set of trading strategies S. We then update our analysis based on
current observations of the real market (step 3); and ﬁnally we choose new mechanism rules
that maximise our design objectives based on in-silico simulations of our proposed new
design (step 5), before iterating the design cycle.
In (Phelps et al, 2003) we described how step 7 could be automated in order to eval-
uate market mechanisms with arbitrary design objectives and domain assumptions. Firstly
we restricted attention to varying the parameter k in the transaction pricing rule given in
equation 3, and evaluated a ﬁtness function which combined two different objectives in a
weighted sum: i) the extent to which the market structure favoured particular groups of
traders (buyers or sellers); and (ii) the efﬁciency of the market. For each value of k, the
objective function was assessed by running agent-based simulations with randomly-drawn
valuations in order to estimate expected values of these metrics.
Figure 1 shows our empirical results for a double-auction obtained from simulations
populated with sixty risk-neutral agents homogeneously equipped with a strategy based on
the variant of the Roth-Erev reinforcement learning algorithm (Erev and Roth, 1998) de-
scribed in (Nicolaisen et al, 2001). The Roth-Erev strategy discretizes the space of possible
offer prices, yielding a set of possible actions which can be thought of as pure strategies
in a game of imperfect information. It then chooses actions stochastically with probabilities
weighted in proportion to the cumulative past payoffs accrued to a particular action, in much
the same way that ﬁtness-proportionate selection operates in a co-evolutionary genetic algo-
rithm. A potential advantage of the Roth-Erev algorithm over co-evolutionary algorithms is
that the model has been tested against human data from controlled laboratory experiments13.
As can be seen from Figure—1, the optimal mechanism under this model is a pricing
rule with k = 0:5. One of the restrictions of this approach is that we are constrained by our
13 Although this claim remains controversial since the model has many free parameters which need to be
calibrated.18
ability to parameterise the auction design space. Although much progress has been made
towards this goal, both in the general case (Wurman et al, 2001) and in the speciﬁc case
of the double auction (Niu et al, 2008), it is interesting to consider whether it is possible
to view mechanism design as a less restricted search problem by using approaches which
view mechanism design as an open-ended search for symbolic rules, thus allowing possi-
ble solutions which have not been a-priori categorized. In (Phelps et al, 2003) we extended
the search space to all possible transaction pricing rules expressed as a symbolic linear
function of bid, ask and quote prices. This space was searched heuristically using Genetic
Programming Koza (1993), and our evolved symbolic rule was close to the k = 0:5 solu-
tion suggested by the more restrictive search, thus validating this as a potential approach to
automated mechanism design.
In the case of single-sided auctions for a single unit of commodity, the revenue equiva-
lence theorem (Krishna, 2002) states that if our design objective is restricted to maximising
the revenue of the seller, then any value of k will sufﬁce to achieve our design criterion
provided that all bidders are risk-neutral and valuations are determined homogeneously by
drawing signals from a random distribution that is common to all agents. However these
assumptions are often violated in practice. (Byde, 2003) used a similar approach to ours
in which he used a co-evolutionary genetic algorithm in place of reinforcement-learning to
model the strategic behavior of agents in single-sided auctions. His goal was to search for
values of k within the space of single-sided mechanisms, with a view to ﬁnding revenue-
maximising auctions in scenarios where agent’s risk attitudes and valuations are determined
heterogeneously.Byvaryingparametersgoverningriskpreferencesandcommonalityofval-
uations he was able to demonstrate that values of k intermediate between k = 0 and k = 1
are optimal depending on our assumptions about the speciﬁcs of the economic environment
to hand.
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Fig. 1 Fitness F (with one standard deviation) plotted against k for a market with 60 traders.19
3.2.1 Empirical game-theory in mechanism design
There are several drawbacks with the type of approach discussed in the previous section,
since we either: i) assume that the particular strategy (eg Roth-Erev) used in the agent-based
model constitutes a strategic equilibrium which other strategies are unable to invade; or ii)
if we use co-evolutionary search to explore a larger space of strategies, we assume that the
asymtotic states of the co-evolutionary algorithm similarly constitute Nash equilibria. As
discussed in Section 2.1.3, neither of these assumptions are guaranteed to hold.
To deal with this criticism, in later work we used empirical game-theory14to analyse
the effect of changing from a uniform to a discriminatory pricing rule. Within this context,
the analysis from the previous section can be understood as an empirical game-theoretic
analysis restricted to a single heuristic strategy: the Roth-Erev strategy. However, in (Phelps
et al, 2006b) we extended our analysis to four classes of strategy: i) the Roth-Erev strategy
(RE), ii) the truth-telling strategy (TT), iii) the Gjerstad-Dickhaut strategy (GD) (Gjerstad
and Dickhaut, 2001) and iv) Kaplan’s sniping strategy (TK) (Friedman and Rust, 1991). As
in Walsh et al (2002) we used the replicator-dynamics differential equation to model how
agents switch between these strategies in response to observed payoffs:
_ mj =
£
u(ej;m) ¡ u(m;m)
¤
mj (4)
where m is a mixed-strategy vector, u(m;m) is the mean payoff when all players play m,
and u(ej;m) is the average payoff to pure strategy j when all players play m, and _ mj
is the ﬁrst derivative of mj with respect to time. Strategies that gain above-average payoff
become more likely to be played, and this equation models a simple co-evolutionary process
of mimicry learning, in which agents switch to strategies that appear to be more successful.
Foranyinitialmixed-strategywecanﬁndtheeventualoutcomefromthisco-evolutionary
process by solving _ mj = 0 for all j to ﬁnd the ﬁnal mixed-strategy of the converged popu-
lation. This model has the attractive properties that: (i) all Nash equilibria of the game are
stationary points under the replicator dynamics; and (ii) all Lyapunov stable states Lyapunov
(1966) and interior limit states are also Nash equilibria (Weibull, 1997, pp. 88–89).
Thus the Nash equilibrium solutions are embedded in the stationary points of the di-
rection ﬁeld of the dynamics speciﬁed by equation 4. Although not all stationary points are
Nash equilibria, by overlaying a dynamic model of learning on the equilibria we can see
which solutions are more likely to be discovered by boundedly-rational agents. Those Nash
equilibria that are stationary points at which a larger range of initial states will end up, are
equilibria that are more likely to be reached (assuming an initial distribution that is uniform
and that the replicator dynamics are an accurate description of the switching process).
Forasubset n = 3ofourstrategieswecangeometricallyprojectthespaceofallpossible
mixed-strategy vectors, called the unit-simplex15, onto a two dimensional triangle denoted
42 whose vertices correspond to the pure strategies (1;0;0), (0;1;0), and (0;0;1). This
gives us an intuitive visualisation of the dynamics of the learning process; by plotting the
time-evolution of equation 4 we can identify the switching between our heuristic strategies.
Figure 2 shows the direction ﬁeld when we consider evolutionary switching between the
three strategies TT, RE and GD, in a k = 0:5 uniform-price clearing-house market populated
by jAj = 12 agents which are selected at random from a larger population of traders on each
play of the game.
14 As pioneered by (Walsh et al, 2002); see Section 2.2 for a full description and literature review.
15 4n¡1 = fx 2 Rn :
Pn
i xi = 1g20
The direction ﬁeld gives us a map which shows the trajectories of strategies of learning
agents engaged in repeated interactions, from a random starting position. Thus, for Figure 2,
each agent participant has a starting choice of 3 pure strategies (TT, RE and GD) and any
mixed (probabilistic) combination of these three. The arrows indicate the direction of con-
vergence when any such strategy is adopted. The three pure strategies (here, TT, RE and
GD) are represented by the three vertexes of the simplex. A point on an external edge of the
simplex represents a mixed strategy comprising two of the three pure strategies, and a point
strictly inside the simplex represents a mixed strategy comprised of all three pure strategies.
Thus, for example, the point on the left-most edge between the vertexes labeled TT and RE
which is one-third the way from the vertex labeled TT represents a mixed strategy where
strategy TT is chosen 66.7% of the time, strategy RE is chosen 33.3% of the time, and strat-
egy GD not chosen at all; this position on the simplex is denoted (66.7, 33.3, 0). A vector
(a line with an arrow) shows the likely direction of strategic play from any given initial
position. In other words, if the arrows converge on some point in the simplex, this strategy
represented by that point is the end-point of repeated interactions as the game proceeds.
TT 
RE 
GD 
Fig. 2 3-dimensional replicator dynamics direction ﬁeld for a 12-agent clearing-house auction with the three
strategies RE, TT and GD.
The Nash equilibrium solutions of the heuristic-game are embedded in the stationary
points of the direction ﬁeld of the dynamics speciﬁed by equation 4. In Figure—2 there
are two equilibria: a pure-strategy GD equilibrium at the bottom right of the simplex, and a
mixed-strategy comprising a high probability of TT and a low probability of RE near the bot-
tom left of the simplex. Although not all stationary points are Nash equilibria, by overlaying
a dynamic model of learning on the equilibria we can see which solutions are more likely
to be discovered by boundedly-rational agents. Those Nash equilibria that are stationary
points at which a larger range of initial states will end up, are equilibria that are more likely
to be reached (assuming an initial distribution of mj that is uniform and that the replicator
dynamics is an adequate model of the switching process); in the terminology of dynamic
systems they have a larger basin of attraction. The basin of attraction for a stationary point21
is proportion of mixed strategies in 4 which have ﬂows terminating at that point16. The
larger the basin, the larger the region of strategy-space which leads to the attractor, and the
more attainable the corresponding equilibrium (Bullock, 1997), and hence the higher its
probability of occurring.
This analysis is highly valuable for the purposes of mechanism design, since different
equilibria will yield different outcomes and different values of our design objectives, such as
market efﬁciency, and we would like to weight these according to their likelihood. In other
words, we would like to compute the size of the basin of attraction of each equilibrium, in
order to arrive at a probability of the equilibria actually occurring, and use this to calculate
the expected value of our design metrics. We can then weight the design objectives for each
mechanism according to the probability distribution over equilibria, which will allow us to
provide more realistic estimates for our design metrics.
In (Phelps et al, 2006b) we used numerical methods to estimate the basin size of equilib-
ria for n = 4 strategies for two different variants of the double-auction: i) a clearing-house
(CH) in which offers from all agents are collected before the market is cleared; and ii) a
continuous double-auction (CDA) in which the market is cleared as new offers arrive. Our
main results are reproduced in Table 1.
CH
jAj = 4 jAj = 6 jAj = 12
¯(0;0;1;0) = 0:39 ¯(0;0;1;0) = 0:31
¯(0;0;0;1) = 0:61 ¯(0;0;0;1) = 0:69 ¯(0;0;0;1) = 1
U = (1:00;0:90;1:00;1:00) U = (1:00;0:92;1:00;1:00) U = (1:00;0:93;1:00;1:00)
EA = 1:00 EA = 1:00 EA = 1:00
CDA
jAj = 4 jAj = 6 jAj = 12
¯(0;0;0:84;0:16) = 0:97 ¯(0;0;0:8;0:2) = 1
¯(0;0;0;1) = 1 ¯(0;0;0;1) = 0:03
U = (0:89;0:86;0:98;0:89) U = (0:85;0:88;0:98;0:86) U = (0:85;0:89;0:99;0:90)
EA = 0:89 EA = 0:96 EA = 0:97
Table 1 Heuristic-strategy equilibria over (TT;RE;GD;TK) for CH versus CDA
These results give us probabilities over outcomes, and hence the ability to assess the
design of each mechanism. The value of EA in each cell of Table 1 shows the expected
efﬁciency of the mechanism. This is computed by weighting the pure-strategy payoffs U
according to the probability of the pure strategy being played. For example, in the case of
CDA with jAj = 6 agents, we see that there are two possible equilibria. The ﬁrst equilibrium,
(0;0;0:84;0:16), has a probability of 0:97 of being adopted. In this equilibrium the strategy
GD has a probability 0:84 whereas the strategy TK has a probability of 0:16. By examining
the payoffs to each of these strategies we can compute the expected efﬁciency of the mecha-
nism in this equilibrium: 0:84£0:98+0:16£0:86 = 0:96. In the second equilibrium we see
that the strategy TK has a probability 1 of being played, hence the efﬁciency of this second
equilibrium is 0:86. We then weight our overall efﬁciency according to the probability of
each equilibrium: 0:96 £ 0:97 + 0:86 £ 0:03 = 0:96.
For the most part efﬁciency outcomes are deterministic — there is either a unique equi-
librium that captures the entire simplex or all equilibria yield the same efﬁciency. The ex-
16 Intuitively, it can be helpful to conceptualise basin size as the volume of the state space which terminates
at the attractor. However, strictly speaking this deﬁnition is not accurate. For example, if we have chaotic
dynamics then a strange attractor may capture many ﬂows, but the volume of its basin will be zero.22
ception is the CDA with jAj = 6 agents. Here we have a mixed TK and GD equilibrium with
efﬁciency EA = 0:97 versus a pure TK equilibrium with a signiﬁcantly lower efﬁciency
of EA = 0:86. Since the TK equilibrium has a very small basin of attraction ¯ = 0:03
we conclude that the lower efﬁciency outcome is not very likely, and hence if we have no
prior knowledge of existing strategy frequencies in the trading population at large we as-
sume a uniform distribution over starting points M ½ 4 and conclude that our efﬁciency
is still likely to be very high. However, in the case where we do have prior knowledge
about the frequency of strategies, e.g. we are tasked with evaluating a proposed choice of a
continuous-clearing rule for a six-agent marketplace in which we already observe high pro-
portion of sniping, then we might conclude that the pure TK equilibrium is much more likely
to be reached (since we will be starting within its attractor), and thus we might recommend
that CH clearing is used instead in order to avoid the probable efﬁciency hit predicted by
our analysis. This hypothetical design tweak would yield an efﬁciency gain of 0:97 ¡ 0:86,
or 11 percentage points, at the expense of transaction throughput. Thus by analysing the
strategic dynamics of a proposed mechanism, we can perform evolutionary mechanism de-
sign whereby we make design decisions under legacy constraints (in this hypothetical sce-
nario our legacy constraint is an existing marketplace populated by snipers). Evolutionary
mechanism design is analogous to evolutionary game theory in that just as players may be
constrained to gradually adjust their strategies, similarly mechanisms cannot always make
instantaneous adjustments in their rules irrespective of what strategies are currently in play.
3.3 Iterative reﬁnement of heuristic-strategy analysis
One of the criticisms of empirical game-theoretic analysis used in the previous section is
that it is highly sensitive to the set of heuristic strategies S, which can never be truly com-
prehensive for an initial design. In recent work (Phelps et al, 2008, 2006a) we attack this
problem by introducing an algorithm called FISH+ for searching for new heuristic strategies
within an iterative mechanism-design context. Conventional approaches to strategy optimi-
sation use a strategy’s payoff as the basis of an objective function. In contrast, the objective
function in our approach is the strategy’s likelihood of being adopted in equilibrium play, as
estimated from basin size. In (Phelps et al, 2008) we argue that the latter approach is more
suited to heuristic-search of the strategy space in economic scenarios.
The basic idea is to use a sensitivity analysis to identify which of our existing strategies
could obtain a larger basin size, if its expected payoffs could be increased slightly. We then
use heuristic search to ﬁnd variants of this strategy which yield high “market-share”: that is
their probability of occurring in equilibria, given by the equilibria basin size weighted by the
frequency of adoption speciﬁed by the equilibrium mixed-strategy vector. This is formalised
below:
F(i;S;[H]) =
X
x2²[H]S
¯[H](x;M) ¢ xi (5)
where: i is the index of the candidate heuristic strategy being evaluated from amongst the
set of heuristic strategies S with heuristic payoffs [H], ¯[H] denotes the basin size of an
equilibrium in the game deﬁned by payoffs [H], and ²[H]S is the set of heuristic equilibria:
²[H]S = fx 2 4
jSj : ¯[H](x;M) > 2 £ 10
¡2g23
By applying this search iteratively, we can reﬁne our initial heuristic-strategy analysis of
the marketplace and ﬁnd mixtures of strategies that yield large basin sizes which are stable
to payoff perturbation:
input : A set of heuristic strategies S = fs1;s2;:::sng for some mechanism ¹
output: A reﬁned set of heuristic-strategies
[H] Ã GetHeuristicPayo®Matrix(S;¹); 1
repeat 2
^ F Ã maxi=1:::n F(i;S;[H]); 3
for i Ã 1 to n do 4
[H]0 Ã perturb payoffs in [H] in favour of si; 5
if F(i;S;[H]0) > ^ F then 6
^ F Ã F(i;S;[H]0); 7
i* Ã i; 8
^ OS Ã si; 9
end 10
end 11
if ^ F < F(i*;S;[H]) then return S; 12
¦ Ã create a search space based on generalisations of ^ OS; 13
OS Ã argmaxs*2¦ F(1;s*[ S;GetHeuristicPayo®Matrix(s*[ S;¹)); 14
S Ã OS [ S; 15
[H] Ã GetHeuristicPayo®Matrix(S;¹); 16
S Ã eliminate dominated strategies from S based on [H]; 17
until forever ; 18
Algorithm 1: FiSH+
To a mechanism designer, this latter state of affairs is particularly attractive, since larger,
more stable basin sizes correspond to more deterministic, and hence predictable behaviour.
In a legacy mechanism design scenario, if we are able to provide an equilibrium analysis
over existing strategies which demonstrates similarly clear-cut equilibria, then we may be
able to convince participants that these are the best-response strategies that their competitors
are likely to adopt, and therefore that they should adopt also. If we then make the algorithms
corresponding to our new heuristic strategies freely available to participants, and if they
believe our equilibrium analysis, then they are likely to play our prescribed strategies, thus
bringing about our predictions, and hence maximising our design objectives. By ﬁnding new
strategies with large stable attractors, we make our equilibrium analysis more believable
to participants. This is analogous to incentive-compatibility in a conventional mechanism
design scenario, where it is clear to participants that TT is the traders’ best-response to
the mechanism: in an incentive-compatible mechanism TT is a “freely-available” strategy
with a large attractor. In realistically complex mechanisms such as the double-auction, TT is
dominated.Howeverbyapplyingthe FISH+algorithmwecanﬁndanalogsof TT forcomplex
mechanisms.
Of course, in our new equilibria, our existing mechanism rules may no longer maximise
our design objectives. In this paper, we have described real-life mechanism design as an it-
erative process, and that is exactly how evolutionary mechanism design addresses this issue.
Thus our revised pseudo-code for evolutionary mechanism design is as follows:24
input : A set of initial heuristic strategies S, and a legacy mechanism ¹
repeat 1
S Ã FiSH+(S;¹); 2
publicise S to participants; 3
x Ã frequency of each strategy observed in vivo; 4
S Ã S [ f strategies observed in vivo g ; 5
¤ Ã space of feasible variants of ¹; 6
¹ Ã argmax¹¤2¤ EvaluateDesignObjectives(¹¤;S;x); 7
implement rules deﬁned by ¹; 8
until forever ; 9
Algorithm 2: Evolutionary mechanism design
4 Summary
Economists have long used idealized models of agent behaviour in order to understand mar-
ket behaviour. AI practitioners have had to adapt these models in order to build actual agents,
and the resulting engineering approach to agents’ behaviour requires more sophisticated
and complex models. Similarly, it has recently been understood that the idealized notion of
a “free” market is not always applicable, since actual markets entail many rules that gov-
ern their operation. Building real markets entails an engineering approach just as does the
building of real agents.
In this paper we have reviewed iterative methodologies for the engineering of market
mechanisms, which we categorize under the banner of evolutionary mechanism design. This
differs from traditional mechanism design, which is a static analysis based on rigidly deﬁned
design objectives, in which a theoretically pristine mechanism is launched into the worldand
then remains forever in Nash equilibrium stasis. Evolutionary mechanism design, in con-
trast, attempts to take an engineering approach, and approach that is empirical, incremental,
and partly automated. It is not theoretically beautiful, but it is able to take into account real-
life ugliness: arbitrary multiple design objectives, dynamic adjustment to equilibrium, and
constant feedback from an in vivo mechanism.
Just as with engineering methods for other complex real-world domains, such as soft-
ware engineering, our initial analysis cannot be relied upon to be completely accurate and
future-proof (Bittner and Spence, 2006; Beck, 1999). Therefore we continually update our
analysis in response to feedback from the in vivo mechanism: in steps 4 and 5 we compare
our predictions with actuality, and update our set of heuristic strategies S and their observed
frequency in the population x.
Finally, the resulting status quo may not be optimal for our purposes; for example, we
may be able to improve the likelihood of achieving certain design objectives, such as market
efﬁciency or liquidity (transaction throughput) by making small adjustments in a subset of
the space of mechanism rules, for example by adjusting parameters such as k in the market
clearing rules (equations 2 and 3), as we saw in Section 3.2.
4.1 Future work
In this paper we have concentrated on the purely computational aspects of the method: that
is, in silico analysis. In so doing, we have glossed over some of the challenges presented by
the in vivo analysis of real-life market places, which may be considerable. For example, in
Section 3.2.1, we saw how our design objectives were affected when we considered different25
weightings over the frequency with which sniping strategies were observed in the existing
mechanism. In the case of a strategy such as sniping, it is relatively straightforward to de-
termine which traders are adopting this strategy, provided that one has access to sufﬁcient
historical market data, since we can simply look at the timing of agents’ shouts; Roth and
Ockenfels (Roth and Ockenfels, 2002) provide just such an analysis of the eBay market-
place, which validates that steps 4 and 5 can be performed in vivo in the case of a single
class of strategy.
However, inferring the existence of other classes of strategies in a real market presents
a signiﬁcant challenge, not least because the true valuation of each agent is not directly ob-
servable. Without any prior knowledge of an agent’s valuation, it is very difﬁcult to infer
whether they are using a strategy even as simple as truth-telling. That is not to say, how-
ever, that making inferences about valuations is impossible, especially from the privileged
vantage point of the agent controlling the mechanism, who potentially has full access to
the history of traders’ interactions with the market. We may, for example, be able to infer
bounds on an agent’s valuation by analysing the order statistics of their trade prices over
small time periods; or by analysing their trading behaviour in alternative markets for the
same commodity; or, in the case of an ascending auction format such as eBay, by observing
the price at which runner-up bidders drop out of the auction. With estimates of valuations in
hand, it would possible in many cases to infer an agent’s strategy. The reverse-engineering
of valuations and strategies from market data is a promising area of research, both for those
seeking to make proﬁt, as well as for economists seeking to understand the dynamics of
real-world marketplaces, and there is an emerging literature in this area (Engle-Warnick and
Rufﬂe, 2001; Engle-Warnick, 2003) to draw upon.
Although it might be impractical in the context of an academic research programme to
apply these in vivo methods in the context of a market such as a stock exchange, it may
be possible to apply them to a markets such as the University of Iowa prediction markets
(Surowiecki, 2004). Prediction markets are exchanges with unique design considerations
(Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004), and an interesting possible research programme would be to
conduct a full in vivo case study of the application of evolutionary mechanism design to a
real-life prediction market through several iterations of the design cycle.
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